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LANGDELLIAN LIMERICKS
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗

Abstract
Christopher Columbus Langdell
Used cases to teach the law well.
So everyone thought,
Except for distraught
Students in Socratic hell.
Theirs is no lone cri de coeur.
Now bashing Langdell’s de rigueur.
Knowing case law alone,
A young lawyer is prone
To resemble a high-priced poseur.
After a part that rehearses
Anti-Langdellian curses;
The Author proceeds
To attend to the needs
Of students who learn best through verses.
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INTRODUCTION
In introducing the case method as the core of legal education,
Christopher Columbus Langdell assumed the role as an initiator of
a discursive practice. Discursive practices are not just ways of
producing discourse. Rather they “become embodied in technical
processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behavior, in forms
for transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms.”1
Langdell’s case method and the related Socratic approach to legal
education illustrate the propensity of discursive practices to adapt
and survive long after their original premises have been discarded.2
As one commentator noted, “One of the strengths of the caseteaching method, and there are many, lies oddly enough in its
ability to disprove Langdell’s conception of law.”3 Langdell’s
pedagogy has survived other aspects of his legal thought precisely
because the former is an institutionalized discursive practice.4 Law
professors teach using Langdell’s method in part because that is
how they learned the law, and in part because the teaching
materials most readily available to them facilitate teaching through
the case method. But inertia alone does not explain Langdell’s

1

Michel Foucault, History of Systems of Thought, in LANGUAGE, COUNTERMEMORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS BY MICHEL
FOUCAULT 199, 200 (Donald F. Bouchard, ed., 1977)
2

See, e.g., Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method and What
to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 610 (2007) (cataloguing changes since
the advent of the case method but noting that “we legal educators are still doing
the same basic thing we were doing one hundred and thirty years ago”); Russell
L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy, Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REV.
517, 545 (1991) (observing that Langdell’s method has achieved a dominant
position in U.S. law schools despite the fact that Langdell’s justification for his
method “has long since been repudiated”).
3

Eric Mills Holmes, Education for Competent Lawyering – Case Method in
a Functional Context, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 556 (1976). See also John J.
Costonis, The McCrate Report: Of Loaves, Fishes, and the Future of American
Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 160 (1993) (observing that Langdell’s
vision of the law did not survive Legal Realism but his law school did survive);
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 24 (1983)
(noting that Langdell’s educational innovations helped undermine his approach
to legal doctrine).
4

See Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method,
60 VAND. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007) (likening the survival of the case method to
that of religious traditions that “once embedded in custom and experience, give
rise to new rationales when the old ones fade away”).
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resilience.5 Many professors utilize Langdell’s approach because
they think it is the method best suited to legal education,6 given the
physical, financial and practical constraints within which law
schools must operate.7
Right from the start, Langdell’s method has been subjected to
fundamental criticisms, and those criticisms have been remarkably
consistent.8 Many of Langdell’s ideas seemed strange to his

5

See John C.P. Goldberg, What Nobody Knows, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1461,
1496 (2006) (rejecting the notion that the case method’s survival can be
attributed to “some combination of inertia and faculty inattentiveness”).
6

See, e.g., Rakoff & Minow, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 598 (crediting Langdell’s
method with meeting the multiple goals of legal education); Ruta K. Stropus,
Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law School
Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 449, 50 (1996)
(describing Langdell’s method as the best means for teaching students to
analyze effectively, think independently and express themselves verbally”).
However, Rakoff and Minow conclude that Langdell’s method is no longer
adequate if the aim is to teach 21st-century students to think like laywers. 60
VAND. L. REV. at 600
7

See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 63 (1983) (noting that the case method

AMERICA
permitted
law school class sizes to expand to the size of the largest-available lecture halls);
Costonis, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. at 160-61 (contending that the case method is a
more significant economic than pedagogical phenomenon, since it facilitates
large-class teaching).
8

See, e.g., STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 57 (citing criticisms of Langdell’s
method going back to 1876); James R. Maxeiner, Educating Lawyers Now and
Then: Two Carnegie Critiques of the Common Law and the Case Method, 35
INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 1, 1 (2007) (noticing that the two Carnegie reports on legal
education, though separated by three generations, offered materially similar
criticisms); Bruce A. Kimball, “Warn Students that I Entertain Heretical
Opinions, Which They Are Not to Take a Law”: The Inception of Case Method
Teaching in the Classrooms of the Early C.C. Langdell, 1870-1883, 17 LAW &
HIST. REV. 57, 59-61 (1999) (quoting from some of Langdell’s students’
negative evaluations of his pedagogy) [hereinafter Kimball, Warn Students];
Weaver, 36 VILL. L. REV. at 533-537 (detailing the early criticisms of the case
method as articulated by Langdell’s students, his colleagues and recent Harvard
Law School alumni). In 1930, Samuel Williston reviewed J.H. Landman’s The
Case Method of Studying Law, which recommended that the case method be
replaced with a problem-based approach and articulated many of the criticisms
of the case method that we still hear today. Williston, Book Review, 43 HARV.
L. REV. 972 (1930). See also Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It’s
Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241, 241 (1992) (arguing that
the problem method is better suited than the case method to the taks of moderln
legal education – to train lawyers rather than to develop a “science of law”);
Jacob Henry Landman, Anent the Case Method of Studying Law, 4 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 141, 150-54 (1927) (debunking Langdellian notions of law as science); id.
at 155-59 (proposing what he calls the “project method” as an alternative to the
case method).

4
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contemporaries or near-contemporaries9 and they seem stranger
still today.10 Langdell’s ideas about the nature of law were clearly
alien to the Legal Realists,11 and even Langdell’s sympathetic
biographer describes him as a “misfit.”12 Yet, the case method
and the Socratic style of teaching persist and are still practiced by
the vast majority of legal academics, at least in the larger doctrinal
courses.13 There is no reason to think that law schools will
9

See, e.g., STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 119-22 (1983) (noting that reports on
the state of legal education published in the early 20th century found Langdell’s
case method inefficient and impractical); Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 611
(observing that, because of the rise of the administrative state, Langdell’s
approach to education was already out-of-date one hundred years ago); Paul F.
Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is There a Case against the Case
System? 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 169-70 (1986) (noting that most of Langdell’s
colleagues regarded the case method as an “abomination”); Franklin G.
Fessenden, The Rebirth of the Harvard Law School, 33 HARV. L. REV. 493, 49899 (1920) (describing Langdell’s first course in contracts and reporting that most
students “condemned” Langdell’s approach). Karl Llewellyn found it hard to
imagine “a more wasteful method of imparting information about subject matter
than the case-class.” Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 211, 215 (1948).
10

See John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the
American Legal Realists: The Professionalization of the American Law
Professor, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 314 (1985) (characterizing Langdell’s
pedagogical ideas as “daft” and contending that they were viewed as odd by
Langdell’s contemporaries as well).
11

See Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 613, n.9 (summarizing the legal realists’
passionate antipathy for Lagndellian formalism). Jerome Frank dismissed the
case method as an expression of Langdell’s “peculiar temperament,” which
Frank regarded as evidencing an obsessive attachment to books and libraries.
Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyers-School? 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 90708 (1933).
12

Bruce A. Kimball, The Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century of
Historiography, 1906-2000, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 277, 279 (2004).
13

See, e.g., ROY STUCKEY, ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION
207 (2007) (“The principal method for teaching legal doctrine and analytical
skills in United States’ law schools is the Socratic dialogue and case method.”);
ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK
LIKE A LAWYER” 141-73 (2007) (discussing literature contending that use of the
Socratic method is on the wane and concluding that most law professors in the
first year still rely on some version of a dialogic method, although classic, strict
Socratic teaching is now a rarity); Rakoff & Minow, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 597
(observing that the first-year curriculum “remains remarkably similar” to that
invented by Langdell); Steven I. Friedard, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching
Techniques in American Law Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1996)
(reporting survey results indicating that 97% of law professors teaching firstyear courses employ the case method); Weaver, 36 VILL. L. REV. at 543 (calling
the case method “unquestionably the primary mode of instruction in U.S. law
schools” and noting that it had been adopted by every U.S. law school).
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abandon Langdell’s pedagogical model entirely and so there is
every reason to make that model as responsive as it can be to the
needs of 21st-century law students. In part, this goal can be
achieved by supplementing Langdell’s approach with an eye to
addressing the concerns raised by its critics.
The case method survives in part because it is a flexible
approach to law teaching. One can always combine Socratic
teaching with lectures on doctrine, problems, group work, drafting
exercises and other useful approaches. In employing the case
method, one can play with Langdell’s method in various ways, one
of which is the subject of this Article. In my first years of teaching
I composed Limericks to memorialize key cases and shared those
Limericks with my students during class.14 I add to the collection
of Limericks when I teach new materials or when they seem to
require some tweaking. In what follows, I justify this practice as a
means of accomplishing some of the goals of the case method and
as a means of addressing some of the criticisms of that method.
Part I below outlines the main characteristics of Langdell’s
case method, highlighting its strengths as an educational approach.
Part II summarizes the leading criticisms of Langdell’s pedagogy.
Finally, Part III provides a sampling of Limericks which
summarize some of the cases found in contracts case books and
discusses how Limericks can be used to achieve pedagogical goals
consistent with Langdell’s approach.15 In addition, I argue that the
Limericks help to temper some of the harsher aspects of the
Socratic method and thus go some way to addressing the concerns
of Langdell’s critics.

14

This Article contains only a sampling of the Limericks. The complete
collection of my Langdellian Limericks can be found in the appendix. Those
interested in seeing more Limericks can find both Contracts and Business
Associations Limericks on the ContractsProf Blog (the official blog of the
AALS
Section
on
Contracts):
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/limericks/.
15

A discussion of Limericks about contracts cases is especially appropriate
here, because Langdell introduced his Socratic method in a contracts course.
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL ASS'N, CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL 1817-1917 34-35 (1918) (describing Langdell’s first use of the Socratic
method, in a discussion with his students of the contracts case, Payne v. Cave).
Moreover, Langdell’s first case book was designed for his course on contracts
law. CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS (1871).
In addition, there is precedent for scholarly
presentations of Limericks devoted to contracts cases. Douglass G. Boshkoff,
More Selected Poems on the Law of Contracts: Raintree County Memorial
Library Occasional Paper No. 2, 91 NW. L. REV. 295 (1996); Boshkoff,
Selected Poems on the Law of Contracts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1533 (1991).

6
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ELEMENTS OF LANGDELL’S PEDAGOGY

Langdell’s pedagogy was an inductive method based on the
natural sciences.16 Langdell regarded the status of “science” as
necessary in order to justify the study of law as an academic
discipline and as a graduate course of study. If law were not a
science, wrote Langdell, it would “best be learned by serving an
apprenticeship to one who practices it.”17 The notion that an
understanding of law could best be won through apprenticeship to
a practicing attorney was precisely the model of legal education
that Langdell strove to overcome.18 Langdell regarded the case
method as a form of inductive science because he believed that
legal principles could only be appreciated in the context in which
they arose. As a result, Langdell famously and somewhat
notoriously proclaimed that the laboratory in which legal science
was to be conducted was the law library, in which appellate
decisions were collected.19
Langdell’s conception of law as a science was not very richly
developed. In order to master law, Langdell encouraged his
students to discover basic legal principles or doctrines, which
Langdell believed to be relatively few in number.20 Langdell
believed that these principles were best to be discovered in
appellate court decisions.21 Students educated according to
Langdell’s method discovered for themselves the development of
legal rules through an intensive study of case law.22 Langdell
16

Early defenses of the case method can be found in William A. Keener,
Methods of Legal Education II, 1 YALE L.J. 143 (1892); Christopher Columbus
Langdell, Teaching Law as a Science, 21 AM. L. REV. 123 (1887).
17

C. C. LANGDELL, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, A RECORD OF THE
COMMEMORATION, NOVEMBER FIFTH TO EIGHT[H], 1886, ON THE TWO
HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD
COLLEGE 97-98 (Cambridge, Mass., 1887).
18

See STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 51-64 (describing the struggle between
Langdell’s followers and those who wanted to continue to employ practitioners
as law professors).
19

Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW
Q. REV. 123,124 (1887).
20

LANGDELL, LAW OF CONTRACTS at vii.

21

STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 52.

22

See WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF
MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION
(New York, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994), at 3 (“In Langdell’s formulation, legal education is the
study of a few fundamental principles that are found in the original sources –
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further believed that, through rigorous development of the caselaw approach to legal science, he and his followers could eliminate
jurisdictional deviations from ideal legal practices and thus
establish a “unitary, self-contained, value-free and consistent set of
principles” that could be applied to any case that might arise.23
Langdell thus aimed to use his scientific approach to legal
education to train a generation of lawyers and legal reformers who
could perfect the law as a system of neutral, predictable, practical,
efficient rules.
An unstated assumption of Langdell’s method was that law
was synonymous with judge-made law; that is, the common law.24
Langdell developed his approach to the law before the rise of the
administrative state in the United States.25 As the 20th-century
progressed, the limitations of Langdell’s notion that casebooks
could be used as primary sources of law grew increasingly
obvious, as did the limitations of the analogical reasoning that the
case method helped students develop.26 It thus has become
relatively easy to enumerate aspects of Langdell’s pedagogy that
have become anachronistic. But law professors should not lose
track of the advantages of the case method, as it remains a central
feature of legal education. Legal scholars owe it to their students
and to their students’ future clients to make the case method as
responsive as possible to the needs of law students and the legal
profession.
To that end, it is important to keep in mind the strengths of the
case method, which have been a reason for its survival27 even

cases – and, by implication, are derived from those cases by the process of
induction. Thus the student thinks for himself rather than merely accepts the
secondhand formulation of some treatise writer.”).
23

STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 53. Langdell was aware that not all legal
opinions could be reconciled, but he believed he could identify cases that
proceeded “from an erroneous principle” and therefore must “be regarded as
anomalous.” Kimball, Warn Students, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. at 68 (quoting from
Langdell’s lecture notes).
24

Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 616.

25

Id. at 617-20.

26

See id. at 622 (concluding that Langdell’s method does not train students
“to think like lawyers in the contemporary administrative state”).
27

Previous scholarship has identified five main strengths associated with
Socratic teaching: It helps students to develop analytical skills; it forces them to
think on their feet, it encourages intellectual rigor, teaches students about legal
process and helps them learn about the lawyer’s role or function. Cnythia G.
Hawkins-León, The Socratic Method-Problem Method Dichotomy The Debate
Over Teaching Method Continues, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 1, 5 (1988) (citing

8
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though Langdell himself may not have been recognized those
advantages.28 As we shall see, each strength of the case method
can also be a weakness.29 That is, all aspects of the case method
have come under attack and there is clearly room for improvement
in the way law professors teach through cases and through the
Socratic method.
The primary advantage of Langdell’s method is that it
promotes active learning.30 Because students come to class
knowing that they will be called upon and that they risk appearing
foolish if they are unprepared, they have an incentive to work hard
on their own (or in groups) to gain at least a rudimentary grasp of
the material rather than expecting to be told its significance.31
Through their exposure to case law, students learn to distinguish

Weaver, 36 VILL. L. REV. at 549-61). In what follows, I have organized the
discussion of the strengths of Langdell’s method a bit differently in order to
situate the strengths of the Langdellian method in the context in which they
arise.
28

Langdell’s pedagogy was consistent with some of the groundbreaking
educational reforms of the late 19th century, but there is no evidence that
Langdell was aware of his intellectual kinship with the leading educational
reformers of his day. Charles Eliot, who as Harvard’s President appointed
Langdell to be Dean of the Harvard Law School, believed that Langdell had no
familiarity with the likes of Pestalozzi, Froebel, Seguin and Montessori but
nonetheless implemented their ideas. Charles Eliot, Langdell and the Law
School, 33 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1920). In general, Langdell seems to have
developed his pedagogical strategy by intuition, without the aid or support of
any empirical evidence or immersion in educational theory. See Michael L.
Richmond, Teaching Law to Passive Learners: The Contemporary Dilemma of
Legal Education, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 943, 946-47 (1996) (finding no indication in
Langdell’s writings that he believed the case method to be more effective than
lectures).
29

See Costonis, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. at 160 (remarking that the strengths of
the case method are also weaknesses).
30

See JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE
FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 12 (1914) (observing that,
through the case method, “the intellectual labor . . .is to be performed by the
students, quite independently” even though under the teacher’s guidance);
Richmond, 26 CUMB. L. REV. at 943 (1996) (“Legal education depends on the
active involvement of students in the learning process.”); Stropus, 27 Loy. U.
Chi. L. J. at 466 (observing that Langdell’s method “encourages preparedness as
a necessary component of analysis”).
31

Weaver, 36 VILL. L. REV. at 552-53. Karl Llewellyn acknowledged the
“obvious” value of the case method, including its ability to “enlist active
participation from many, and also silent participation of a whole group.”
Llewellyn, Current Crisis, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. at 211.
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relevant from irrelevant facts, to identify the significant issues
raised in the case and should come to distinguish among levels of
argumentative rigor in legal opinions. Langdell developed his
method in order to combat the passivity of legal education as he
had experienced it, in which students sat, listened, and perhaps
took notes as the instructor lectures them on legal doctrine.32
While contemporary legal reformers would like to go beyond
Langdell in promoting active education, few have argued that a
return to lectures on legal doctrine would benefit students.33 To
this extent, Langdell’s revolution must be accounted a step in the
right direction.
Of almost equal importance, Langdell’s method is designed to
help students think like lawyers.34 It does so by replicating many
of the mental tasks the students will be asked to perform once they
become attorneys.35 Here, the fact that the case method requires
active learning is crucial, since once they get into practice, students
cannot expect the legal issues to be identified in advance, nor can
they approach legal material knowing in advance what they are
looking to find there.36
The case method trains students to think like lawyers in at least
four areas. First, the case method can be used to encourage
students to make the best possible arguments for their clients given
the facts of the case and the legal doctrines in play.37 The Socratic

32

See Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 329, 336-37 (1979) (remarking that the lecture method, the
standard mode of teaching before the advent of the case method, “often left the
majority of students in dazed incomprehension”).
33

See Richmond, 26 CUMB. L. REV. at 950 (noting that legal educators
developing alternatives to the case method have all “proceeded from the same
assumption: that law students would learn best when they took an active role in
the process”).
34

See, e.g., MERTZ, at vii (2007) (noting that students in the first year of law
school are reputed to undergo an intellectual transformation in which they learn
to think like a lawyer); Chase, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. at 342 (“In the popular
reference, the case method sought to teach the uninitiated law student how to
think like a lawyer.”).
35

See STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 56 (“[T]he student is practically doing,
under the guidance of an instructor, what he will be required to do without
guidance as a lawyer.”).
36

See Richmond, 26 CUMB. L. REV. at 944 (highlighting the challenges of
teaching “contemporary students who do not know how to learn by doing”).
37

See MERTZ, at 59 (acknowledging the parallels between Socratic dialogue
and courtroom discourse, as well as the suitability of Socratic teaching to a legal

10

Law Review

2010

method facilitates such role-playing – the instructor simply asks a
student to indentify each party’s best arguments, or best arguments
with respect to a certain issue. If such questioning produces only
puzzlement, the instructor can attempt further gentle, Socratic
prodding by asking which facts are especially helpful or harmful to
either party and which legal theories appear most promising. Such
exchanges might also range into policy discussions if, for example,
neither the facts nor the law are especially helpful to one side or
the other, students can be encouraged to draw on policy
considerations to formulate arguments on behalf of that party.38
Second, the case method introduces law students to the concept
of precedent.39 It provides not only an introduction to the doctrine
but also provides ample opportunities for students to experience
the complexities of precedent. This aspect of the case method
relates to the first in that, in deciding whether or not a particular
precedent applies to the case at hand, students must consider the
peculiar facts of the case and determine whether the precedent
really applies or whether the facts are distinct enough to fall
outside of the precedent or even to raise separate legal issues that
remove it from the doctrinal realm of that precedent entirely.
Third, the case method introduces and gives students exposure
to the canons of both contractual and statutory construction. While
the case method introduces students to canons of construction in
the litigation context, knowledge of such canons can also be of use
to them in drafting courses and thus can contribute to training in
transactional work and even can prepare them for careers in
legislation or law reform.
Fourth, the case method trains students in critical reading and
thinking. The case method does not encourage students to take the
holding of a case as a given. Rather, students are encouraged to
system in which “both parties get their day in court, represented by attorneys
who will engage in vigorous linguistic combat on their behalf”).
38

Dennis Patterson provides the example of a popular casebook that begins
with a case about the termination of an at-will employment agreement. The
casebook provides questions about the case for the students to consider,
including questions that invite students to consider whether the common law of
contracts is efficient and to consider the case from the perspectives of critical
legal studies and feminism. See Dennis Patterson, Langdell’s Legacy, 90
NORTHW. U. L. REV. 196, 202 (1995) (citing CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M.
CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 16 (3d ed.
1993)).
39

Weaver, 36 VILL. L. REV. at 553-58.
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question the reasoning underlying the decision and even to
question whether the case truly stands for the principle for which it
is supposed to stand.40 Here, a professor can expect considerable
resistance coming from two directions. First, students often
emerge from their undergraduate educations with a form of
reverence for textual authority. Encouraging such respect for
authors is an important step in the educational process – one ought
first to appreciate Shakespeare’s gifts before proceeding to a
denunciation of his phallogocentrism. Still, by law school,
students ought to be able to both appreciate and criticize. Second,
many students see law school as a professional training program.
They are practically-minded and want to take away from each class
period only useful information. Questioning a legal rule does not
seem much to the purpose for students who think that law school is
an opportunity to learn the law, understood as a body of rules.
Finally, because of its flexibility, the case method provides
ample opportunity to introduce students to aspects of the law aside
from doctrine. While the cases that are the focus of the case
method are almost invariably appeals, that does not mean that the
procedural history through which they get to the appellate courts is
not a proper subject for class discussion. In fact, the important
differences between appellate review of motions for dismissal or
summary judgment and appellate review of trial court decisions
following trial are often much easier for students to grasp when
they see the play of doctrines learned in civil procedure courses at
work in other doctrinal courses.
The case method also provides myriad opportunities to raise
questions of legal strategy, including questions of settlement or
alternative dispute resolution.41 Most casebooks include at least
one case in which the amount in controversy is so small as to raise
questions about why the parties went to the trouble to appeal.
Casebooks also often include examples of cases in which
potentially winning legal issues were not raised by the parties.
Related to questions of strategy and settlement are also issues of
legal ethics. One can raise such issues with respect to nearly every
case and thus one challenge of teaching using the case method is

40

See STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES at 214 (encouraging law professors
to use hypotheticals in the context of Socratic discussion to “demonstrate
complexity and indeterminacy of legal analysis”).
41

See id. at 558-61 (explaining that the case method can help students
understand the lawyer’s function in both the litigation and non-litigation
contexts, and can teach them to develop arguments and their own advocacy
skills).
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picking the right opportunity to introduce students to particular
questions of legal ethics.
Similarly, no semester of case method teaching passes without
some occasion to discuss issues of legal theory and adjudication.
When students are called upon to address the policy implications
of a certain legal rule or of a challenge to that rule, they inevitably
must consider the purposes of the law and justify their preferences
for certain rules with respect to their own perhaps inchoate notions
of the relationship of legal rules and social justice, economic
efficiency or morality. Nor does the semester pass without several
occasions in which a court does not give the legislature or
administrative agency the deference theoretically due to it or in
which a federal court decides an issue of state law in a manner
arguably at odds with evidence of the state supreme court’s views
on the matter. Such cases provide an opportunity to raise a
different set of policy questions, relating to the role of courts and
of institutional competence more generally.
The facts of cases themselves provide an additional opportunity
to enlighten students (or remind them) that many if not most legal
practices are businesses in which knowledge of other businesses
assists attorneys in advising and guiding their clients. Cases often
include fascinating details that are in fact slices of commercial life,
exposing students to the sort of commercial interactions with
which they are going to have to get comfortable if they are going
to develop a thriving commercial practice. As two of Langdell’s
more insightful critics have acknowledged, Langdell’s method:
…was constructed to address simultaneously several
different questions, each of which must be answered for
a professional school curriculum to succeed with all of
its constituencies and in all of its domains. The
Langdellian case method afforded a way to
communicate information; to cultivate a style of
reasoning and questioning that was intellectually
respectable, yet also well-suited to the paradigmatic law
practice of adjudication;, and to engage the attention
and interests of large numbers of students at relatively
little expense for instruction and materials.42
In short, Langdell’s innovation was a tremendous improvement
over the modes of instruction that preceded it, and it survives
42

Rakoff & Minow, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 598.
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because of it still responds to the demands of the legal academy.
But that does not mean that Langdell’s method is without its
weaknesses.

II.

LANGDELL’S CRITICS

From today’s perspective, it is rather difficult to grasp why or
in what way Langdell thought the case method was “scientific.”43
He conflated notions of science associated with Baconian
induction44 with German notions of science (Wissenschaft) as a
self-contained body of knowledge deduced from fundamental
principles.45
Grant Gilmore thus famously concluded that
Langdell must have been an “essentially stupid man.”46 Gilmore’s
judgment is harsh in part because it is ahistorical. Langdell
developed his method prior to the advent of the social scientific
models that have now come to dominate theories of legal
method.47 Fortunately, one does not have to buy into Langdell’s
positivistic hokum to appreciate the value of having students come
to their own understanding of how legal rules arise through the
seeming chaos of the common law process.48

43

See Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 635 (concluding that Langdell’s notions
that law is a natural science or should follow the methodologies of the natural
sciences “no longer makes sense”); John Henry Schlegel, Langdell’s Auto-da-fé,
17 LAW & HIST. REV. 149, 149 (1999) (providing a post-Realist critique of
Langdell’s idea of science).
44

See STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 52 (“Although Langdell talked of science
in a nineteenth-century way, his vision of legal science would have been
acceptable to Bacon); Howard Schweber, The “Science” of Legal Science: The
Model of Natural Sciences in Nineteenth Century American Legal Education, 17
LAW & HIST. REV. 421, 459 (1999) (describing Langdell’s approach as
“Protestant Baconism”). Others think Langdell’s notions of inductive science
more indebted to Darwin (Marcia Speziale, Langdell’s Concept of Law as
Science: The Beginning of Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L.
REV. 1, 2-4 (1980)), or to Louis Agassiz. Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 633-34.
45

See Laura A. Appelman, The Rise of the Modern American Law School:
How Professionalization, German Scholarship, and Legal Reform Shaped Our
System of Legal Education, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 251, 274-89 (2005)
(explaining the German idea of Wissenschaft and its influence on Langdell and
on U.S. legal education more generally); STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL, at 53 (noting
that Langdell viewed himself as trying to put American law faculties in the
position of such faculties in continental Europe).
46

GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977).

47

Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 636.

48

See, e.g., Schlegel, Landell’s Auto-da-fé, 17 LAW & HIST. at 153
(praising Langdell for engaging his students while conceding that Langdell did
not himself understand what he was doing); Stropus, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. at 466
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Other critics have articulated more fundamental criticisms of
the case method.49 Such critics challenge each of the claimed
benefits of the Langdellian method: it does not really promote
active learning; it does not adequately teach students to think like
lawyers; and thus it is ultimately not nearly as practical or useful as
are rival approaches, such as problems, simulations or clinical
legal education.
According to such critics, Langdell’s method is based on an
outmoded pedagogy, already superseded in the early 20th century
by Dewey’s pragmatic theory of education.50 Langdell’s approach
assumes a pre-existing body of law that students passively learn
rather than learning to think of the law as something that they will
have a hand in shaping.51 Students read cases with an eye to
learning a rule of law rather than analyzing cases to learn legal
methods.52 Moreover, the case method and Socratic questioning
do not really promote active learning because Socratic method
“humiliates, intimidates and silences students.”53 Because a
student’s success at answering a law professor’s questions may

(“The successful Langdellian dialogue goes beyond the rule of law and
challenges students to probe the legal consequences of the argument, to make
distinctions, and to place an order on things.”); John Chipman Gray, Letter to
the Editors of the Yale Law Journal, reprinted in Methods of Legal Instruction,
1 YALE L. J. 139, 159 (1892) (describing how reading cases heightens student
interest in legal material).
49

Bruce Kimball has uncovered extensive evidence that at least some of
these criticisms should not apply to the teaching style of Langdell himself.
Kimball, Warn Students, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. at 66-77. Kimball also attempts
a historical reconstruction of Langdell’s class sessions to illustrate his
conception of Langdell’s method in practice. Id. at 91-131. But the critics are
less interested in Langdell’s practice than in the case method and Socratic
teaching more generally, which in many instances fall short of Langdell’s
practice, as reconstructed by Kimball.
50

Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 646.

51

Id. at 649; see also Llewellyn, Current Crisis, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. at 212
(faulting the case method for providing solutions to the problems posed in
advance and thus not encouraging students to develop their own powers of
reasoning and problem-solving).
52

See Hawkins-León, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L. J. at 6 (citing a 1942
report of the AALS committee n teaching and examination methods).
53

James R. Beattie, Jr., Socratic Ignorance: Once More Into the Cave, 105
W. VA. L. REV. 471, 472 (2003); see also Stropus, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. at 456
(citing critics who claim that the Socratic method causes psychological
scarring).
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only lead to further questioning until the student cracks,54 some
student respond to the Socratic method by refusing to play along.55
They prefer to pass or to play the role of genuine stooge rather than
that of Socratic stooge.56
In terms of training students to think like lawyers, critics of
Langdell’s method contend that it “does little to orient students to
the reality of unfolding problems with facts still to be enacted,
client conduct still to take place, and procedural settings still to be
chosen and framed.”57 In the case method, lawsuits are ripped
from their historical and social contexts and thus sterilized so that
students cannot understand the full ramifications of legal
decisions.58 In any case, the case method exposes students almost
exclusively to appellate decisions and thus provides students with
very limited opportunities to develop practical skills related to the
development of litigation strategies at the pre-trial or trial stages,
which constitutes the focus of the vast majority of litigation
practices.59 As a result the case law falls short in the practical area
for which it is best suited: it does not adequately train lawyers even
in the skills necessary to litigation-oriented law practices.60

54

See Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence:
Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 93, 123 (1968)
(noting that students perceive the Socratic method as offering few rewards for
good performance, as the professors response to every answer is simply another
question).
55

See B.A. Glesner, Fear and Loathing in the Law Schools, 23 CONN. L.
REV. 627, 627 (1991) (contending that students respond to the stress of the first
year of law school by “refusing to play the game” through passivity or
aggression or by simply dropping out).
56

See Stropus, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. at 459 (observing that some students
opt out of the Socratic game by passing or claiming to be unprepared, while
others attempt to beat the professor at her own game by humiliating fellow
students).
57

Rakoff & Minow, 60 VAND. L. REV. 600.

58

See Moskovitz, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. at 245-47 (arguing that the problem
method better mirrors what practicing lawyers do and thus prepares students to
“think like lawyersbetter than the case method can do); Karl Llewellyn, On the
Problem of Teaching “Private” Law, 54 HARV. L. REV. 775, 779 (1941)
(advocating a greater focus on problem solving after the first year of law
school).
59

See Stropus, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. at 461 (noting that students might
conclude based on their law school experiences that practical litigation skills are
of little value or consequence); Moskovitz, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. at 244-45
(criticizing the case method for failing to train lawyers or prepare them for
practice).
60

ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 146 (1953)
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More obviously, the case method overemphasizes case law and
underestimates the importance of statutes and rules promulgated by
administrative agencies.61 The case method exaggerates the
adversarial role of the attorney and does not prepare students for
transactional or legislative careers,62 nor does it adequately
introduce students to alternative modes of dispute resolution. Thus
a report conducted on behalf of the Clinical Legal Education
Association described the “unfortunate reality” that “law schools
are simply not committed to making their best efforts to prepare all
of their students to enter the practice settings that await them.”63
In addition to this immanent critique of Langdell’s method,
critics contend that Langdell’s method is especially off-putting for
women and minority students and thus stacks the deck against nontraditional students at the very start of their legal careers.64 From a
“relational feminist”65 perspective, associated with Carol Gilligan66
and Lani Guinier,67 the Socratic method has been described as a

61

See REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD, 41 (noting
that the case law encourages an analysis of separate cases but does not offer
students the opportunity to appreciate the law as a whole); Rubin, 60 VAND. L.
REV. at 631 (“[T]he first-year curriculum remains captive to the refuted
glorification of the common law.”).
62

See HARNO, at 140-44 (arguing that law school instruction does not
prepare students for the problems they will have to address in practice); Rubin,
60 VAND. L. REV. at 641 (observing with regret that transactional law is
virtually absent from the traditional law school curriculum).
63

STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES at 18.

64

Andrea Kayne Kaufman, The Logician Versus the Linguist – An
Empirical Tale of Functional Discrimination in the Legal Academy, 8 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 247 (2002) (arguing that law school education functionally
discriminates against women); Stropus, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. at 462-65
(summarizing scholarship that contends that the case method reflects “white
male” ways of thinking and encourages students who are “assertive,
argumentative, confrontational, controlling, impersonal, logical and abstract”).
65

See e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY 53-60 (2d ed. 2003) (describing the impact of Carol Gilligan’s “cultural
feminism” or “relational feminism” on the law); Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R.
Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights and the
Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 858, 860 (1993) (identifying Gillgan
as the scholar who has “most notably” developed the relational feminist
perspective).
66

CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (6th ed. 1993).
67

LANI GUINER, MICHELLE FINE AND JANE BALIN, BECOMING GENTLEMEN:
WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997).

Langdellian Limericks

17

form of “ritualized combat” in which women are not socialized to
engage.68 Guinier and her co-authors argue that the Socratic
method “devalues and distorts those characteristics traditionally
associated with women such as empathy, relational logic and nonaggressive behavior.”69 By contrast, the Langdellian method is
alleged to reflect “white male values” by encouraging students to
be assertive, argumentative, confrontational, impersonal, logical
and abstract.70 As this summary indicates, such criticisms of law
school pedagogy seem indebted to essentialist notions of
womanhood that many feminists have now rejected.71 However,
Guinier and her co-authors provide strong evidence that men far
outperform women in law school, as measured by grades and
membership in prestigious extracurricular activities such as law
review.72 They argue that the Socratic method, in which professors
may intimidate or belittle students, contributes to a hostile learning
environment for women,73 and the women law students
interviewed for their study self-reported feeling intimidated and
belittled by their professors and by their peers.74

68

Lani Guinier, et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One
Ivey League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 62 (1994).
69

Id. at 80.

70

Stropus, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. at 463.

71

See e.g., ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT ix-x (1988) (criticizing Western feminist
thought for treating the expiences of White, middle-class women as
representative of all women’s experience); Karlan & Ortiz, 87 NW. U. L. REV. at
860 (characterizing relational feminism as “somewhat dangerous and
misguided”); Deborah L. Rhode, The “No-Problem” Problem: Feminist
Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1786 (1991)
(acknowledging the contributions of “relational” feminism inspired by
Gilligan’s work but noting that its emphasis on the contrast between maleassociated abstract rationality and female-associated interpersonal relationships
“reinforces longstanding stereotypes that have restricted opportunities for both
sexes”); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 797, 807
(1989) (accusing relational feminists of attempting to “reclaim the compliments
of Victorian gender ideology while rejecting the insults”).
72

Guinier, et al., 143 U. PA. L. REV. at 59.

73

Id. at 46-47; see also id. at 63 (arguing that the performative aspects of
Socratic teaching also discourage women’s participation); Taunya Lovell Banks,
Gender Bias in the Classroom (2), 14 SOUTH. ILL. U. L. J. 527, 531-33 (1990)
(describing behavior by professors that discourages participation by women).
74

Id. at 51-52; see also Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom (2), 14
SOUTH. ILL. U. L. J. at 533 (identifying hostility from male students as a
challenge that women law students face); Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in
the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137, 146 (1988) (concluding based on a
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Others have reported on similar responses among law students
intending to pursue careers in public interest law,75 working-class
students76 and minority students.77 While the latest studies indicate
that fewer law students express dissatisfaction with their law
school experience, students of color and women continue to be
disproportionately represented among the deeply dissatisfied
students.78 Unfortunately, there is no evidence that legal educators
have hit upon a pedagogy that disadvantages women and minority
students any less than does the Socratic method.79
All of these criticisms need to be taken into account by those
committed to a legal pedagogy best suited to the task of preparing
law students for the challenges they will face after they graduate.
Still, too often in the feeding frenzy of self-criticism, legal scholars
have been remiss in failing to recognize the advantages of

survey of 753 law students that women feel excluded in the law school
classroom environment and that it makes them feel inferior).
75

See ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT
HARVARD AND BEYOND 106 (1992) (concluding that women who entered law
school “with a committment to social justice tended to experience [Harvard Law
S]chool as a sexist and dehumanizing institution”).
76

See id. at 109-22 (finding that working class students at Harvard reported
more anxiety and stress than did more affluent students and that working class
students often succeeded in law school by abandoning any commitment to their
working class identities).
77

See Nancy Dowd, et al., Diversity Matters: Race, Gender and Ethnicity in
Legal Education, 15 U. FL. J. L & PUB. POL’Y 11, 34 (2003) (concluding, based
on data gathered from surveys, that race, ethnicity and gender significantly
affect students’ experiences with legal education); Banks, 14 SOUTH. ILL. U. L.
J. at 536 (1990) (finding African American students were far more likely than
white students to find their professors disrespectful of their comments and likely
to embarrass or put down their students). Unfortunately, there have been very
few empirical studies of the impact of Socratic teaching and the case method on
minority students. See MERTZ, at 174 (“Indeed, with few notable exceptions,
there has been little systematic empirical attention to the effects of race . . . on
students’ experiences.”). The empirical studies that do exist as to the law school
experience of students of color are all based on students’ self-reporting. Id. at
178 Still, these studies routinely show that students of color respond
disproportionately negatively to Socratic teaching. Id. at 178-79.
78

Mitu Gulati, et al., The Happy Charade: An Empirical Examination of the
Third Year of Law School, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 266 (2001).
79

See Linda Whiteman, Women in Legal Education: A Comparison of the
Law School Performance and Law School Experiences of Women and Men 113
(Law School Admission Council, 1996) (concluding that women law students
performed no better in courses taught by alternative methods than they did in
courses taught using the Socratic method).
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Langdell’s approach over the traditional lecture. Having taught
history on the undergraduate level, I am most appreciative of the
Socratic requirement that students come to class prepared and
engaged. The experience may not always be pleasant for students
who are shy or otherwise reluctant to speak in class, but on the
whole, the case method promotes a brand of active learning that is
often sadly lacking on the undergraduate level.80 Indeed, one of
the greatest challenges I have experienced in legal education is to
get the students to transcend the rote repetition of information
imparted during class time and to engage in the constructive play
with legal concepts and strategies that is the stuff of real advocacy.
Too many students sail through their undergraduate educations
without ever being really challenged to engage with difficult
material in a creative and yet disciplined manner.

III. THE PEDAGOGY
LIMERICKS81

OF

LANGDELLIAN

This Part illustrates how one can supplement the case method
with legal Limericks in a way that tempers the naive scientism,
formalism, intimidation of students and other-worldliness that can
characterize Socratic courses. Limericks are not a panacea. There
are innumerable other ways in which Langdell’s method can be –
and has been – improved upon. This Part consists of a presentation
of legal Limericks, most of which summarize a case, with an
explanation of how each Limerick can be used to achieve a
pedagogical goal in connection with the case method.
The Limericks are first and foremost little jokes and pokes that
reduce the anxiety that the Socratic method can induce. Often, the
joke is on the professor. This is intentional. The Limericks can
have a leveling effect that suspends the adversarial nature of the
Socratic method. The suspension is temporary, but its effects spill
over and contribute to a more collaborative learning environment.
The Limericks level because Limericks are silly and also because

80
81

See generally Richmond, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 943.

A colleague objected that my poems are not really Limericks because
Limericks are supposed to be bawdy and mine generally are not. Research
suggests that Limericks, while often colorful, need not be lubricious. For
example, the celebrated nonsense poet Edward Lear is among the most prolific
of limericists, and his Limericks are quite tame. See EDWARD LEAR, THE
COMPLETE VERSE AND OTHER NONSENSE 328-82 (Vivien Noakes, ed. 2002).
Some students have objected to my Limericks on the ground that Limericks are
supposed to be funny, or at least clever, and mine, they tell me, are neither. But
see id.
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they don’t all work. Sometimes there are obvious metrical
stumbles, comic inversions or absurdly forced rhymes. More
often, they present only the most simple-minded renditions of the
facts and law of the case. When the students laugh at the
Limerick, they are in effect laughing at the professor, and perhaps
to some extent at the case method, the legal profession and their
careerist selves, but the laughter is not malicious.
For example, many contracts professors use Ricketts v.
Scothorn82 to introduce the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The
Ricketts court enforced a grandfather’s gratuitous promise to his
granddaughter, Katie, to set aside $2000 for her.83 In reliance on
this promise, Katie quit her job. The case teaches well, but the
award of full expectation damages is troubling, given that Katie
resumed work after her grandfather stopped paying her an annuity
on the principal he had set aside for her.84 If the purpose of
damages in such a case is to permit Katie to recover her reliance
interest, the award of expectation damages in this case is
extravagant.85 The Limerick reflects the difficulty of fitting the
doctrine of estoppel into contracts law:
This was the start of estoppel:
Said Grandpa to Katie, “Poppop’ll
Set you up nice.”
She took his advice,
And left her old job in the shop-pel.
Such imperfections may reflect poorly on the poet, but they are
intended to indicate that often in law, we cannot get the cases to do
exactly what we want them to do. They do not always stand for
clear rules or thoughtful legal reasoning. Often the best response
to a case really is bemusement or befuddlement. Students should
not always be too concerned if they cannot make sense of a case,
nor should they always treat cases as authoritative statements of
the law to be passively absorbed and obeyed. The Limericks thus
help cultivate a healthy skepticism regarding the law.

82

77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).

83

Id. at 367.

84

See id. at 366 (finding that plaintiff was out of work for about a year and
then found a position with the consent and assistance of her grandfather).
85

Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53 (1936).
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Another example of a perhaps usefully unsuccessful
Limerick is this attempt at an explication of Judge Cardozo’s
opinion in Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County
Bank.86 In his virtuoso opinion, Judge Cardozo found a way to
hold a woman to her charitable pledge despite the fact that as Leon
Lipson described it, he could not really base his decision on the
solidly established doctrine of consideration, because the facts did
not really support such a conclusion. Nor could he base his
decision on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, which the facts
might have supported, because the doctrine was not yet firmly
established.87 Lipson likened Cardozo’s opinion to a thaumatrope,
in which two images are depicted on different sides of a card – for
example, a bird on one side and a cage on the other. When the
card is twirled, we see an image of a bird in a cage.88 Cardozo’s
opinion thus arrives at a fair resolution through a sort of sleight of
hand. This Limerick imitates that trick by merging two words into
one forced rhyme:
Although her estate was inheritable,
Ms. Johnston chose to be charitable.
A bargain was struck;
Her heir’s out of luck:
To the College, Cardozo was fairitable.
Perhaps Cardozo attempted to do what he considered fair and
equitable to the college in the case; perhaps he was just being
charitable. Paint both options on a thaumatrope and spin it:
students might see “fairitable.”

A.

Limericks as Aides-Memoires

One advantage of the case method is that the cases often
involve colorful facts, which can serve as a sort of memory hook
on which to hang an article of legal doctrine. However, students
learn in different ways,89 which is, by the way, also a reason to use

86

159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).

87

Leon Lipson, The Allegheny College Case, 23 YALE L. REP. 8, 11 (1977).

88

Id. But see Curtis Bridgeman, Allegheny College Revisited: Cardozo,
Consideration and Formalism in Context, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 149, 161-62
(2005) (arguing that the parties did not really brief the issue of promissory
estoppel and that the doctrine played little role in the opinion).
89

See, e.g. Benjamin V. Madison, III, The Elephant in Law School
Classrooms: Overuse of the Socratic Method as an Obstacle to Teaching
Modern Law Students, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 293, 312-15 (2008) (noting
the increasing recognition on the part of law school professors of the need to
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PowerPoint in the classroom. Reading a case, and even listening
as others engage in Socratic dialogue with the professor, may not
be sufficient to lodge the facts of the case, along with the attendant
rule, in each student’s mind. The Limericks attempt to reinforce
the legal rules by presenting the facts and the rules of the cases in a
format that will be more likely to survive the other batteries to
which the 1L mind is subject. Students who have an ear for meter
and rhyme – or who develop such an ear through exposure to
scores of legal Limericks – may find that the Limericks aid them in
remembering which cases are associated with which rules.
Ray v. William G. Eurice Bros.,90 illustrates both the objective
theory of contracts with respect to intent to be bound and the
nature of contracts damages. The Eurice Brothers signed an
agreement to build a house for Mr. Ray.91 But when the Eurice
brothers took a closer look at Mr. Ray’s specifications, they
realized that their company could not possibly build the house to
Mr. Ray’s specifications for the contract price.92 They refused to
perform, and the trial court was inclined to take pity on these
humble builders, whom the trial judge described as “hatchet and
saw men,”93 but the appellate court would not permit them to
escape the contract.94
Ray’s specs were enough to confound
These “hatchet and saw” men, whose ground
For breaching the pact
Was mistake of fact,
But they signed it and so they are bound.
The Limerick reinforces the simple rule of the case: absent fraud,
duress, incapacity or mistake, a party is bound by what she signs.95

accommodate students’ differing learning styles); Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely,
Taking Back the Law School Classroom: Using Technology to Foster Active
Student Learning, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 551, 565 (2004) (proposing an approach to
legal education that students “come into the classroom with multiple forms of
intelligence acquired in different ways”).
90

93 A.2d 272 (Md. 1952).

91

Id. at 275.

92

Id. at 275-76.

93

Id. at 276.

94

Id. at 279.

95

Id. at 278.
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Few cases are more Limerickworthy than Mills v. Wyman,96 in
which Seth Wyman stiffs Daniel Mills, a good Samaritan who
nursed Seth’s son Levi in what the court believed to be Levi’s last
hours.97
Seth Wyman’s interior forum
Is not the law’s sanctum sanctorum
With this none would quarrel:
Seth’s conduct’s immoral.
Still, he breaches not law but decorum.
The Mills v. Wyman Limerick summarizes the rule of the case, but
it also invites discussion and reflection on the relationship of law
and morality, a theme to which it is important to return throughout
the course.98
Lenawee County Board of Health v. Messerly99 illustrates the
difficulty of using the doctrine of mistake to excuse performance
of a contract. The case turned on the court’s assessment of which
party bore the risk of mistake.100 Messerly involved a transfer of a
residential property that had an insufficient sewage disposal
system, a fact discovered only after the transfer to Carl and Nancy
Pickles had taken place.101 Ordinarily, one would expect the seller
to be the party best positioned to discover such an imperfection in
the property and thus we would expect the assumption of risk to
favor the buyer. But this transfer provided for delivery of the
property in an “as is” condition and that language defeated the
buyer’s excuse of mistake.102
The waste leaked in torrents, not trickles.
96

20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825).

97

The court turned out to be wrong about that, as Geoffrey R. Watson has
shown is his wonderful law story, In the Tribunal of Conscience: Mills v.
Wyman Reconsidered, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1749 (1997).
98

There has been a recent revival of scholarly interest in the relationship of
contract law to morality. See, e.g., Seana Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract
and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007) and three responses thereto
published in Harvard Law Review’s online Forum: Barbara H. Fried, What’s
Morality Got to Do with It? 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 53 (2007), Liam Murphy,
Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 10 (2007), Charles Fried, The
Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2007). This is
a topic that strikes a chord with many students.
99

331 N.W.2d 203 (Mich. 1980).

100

Id. at 210-11.

101

Id. at 205.

102

Id. at 209-10.
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Now the property ain’t worth two nickels.
When “as is” you take,
You eat your mistake,
So bon appetite, Mr. Pickles.
Carroll v. Beardon103 is a case about the sale of a brothel. The
general rule is that illegal contracts are void,104 but this case
illustrates an exception to the rule: the contract is enforceable if the
party seeking enforcement is not a party to the wrongdoing.105
This Limerick recites the rule while implying some skepticism as
to its application in this case:
In Montana arose a dispute
O’er a house of doubtful repute.
The seller madame,
Not in on the scam
May partake of her share of the loot.
The Limerick, like the majority’s holding in Carroll, is in some
tension with the details of the transaction, which make it clear that
what the court treated as a property sale was actually the sale of an
on-going business.106 The deal was structured with higher
payments due during the months when the brothel was likely to
have more business; thus, the seller was clearly implicated in the
transaction. Why did the court ignore these facts? Perhaps
because the brothel was a familiar institution of some importance
to the local economy.107 Its business might have been notorious
but tolerated by the authorities. The case invites discussion about
the interactions of local politics, institutional competence and the
law. While the Limerick mimics the court’s representation that the
seller was not a beneficiary of the brothel’s business, the word
“loot” expresses skepticism.
103

381 P.2d 295 (Mont. 1963).

104

See id. at 296 (noting that many courts will not aid either party to an
illegal contract).
105

Id. at 296-97.

106

See STEWART MACAULEY, et al., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 386-87
(The Concise Course, 2d ed., 2003) (providing details from deposition testimony
indicating that the sale price was far in excess of the value of the property and
that payments were structured to reflect the seasonal rhythms of the prostitution
business).
107

See id. at 387 (suggesting that the court might have been hesitant to shut
down an illegal business that law enforcement had not shut down, though its
operation was likely widely known)
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In Marvin v. Marvin,108 the court ruled that promises made in
the context of a long-term, non-marital relationship can be
enforced if they were express or can be safely implied. I offer two
Limericks on the subject:
The Marvin court’s ruling’s propitious
For relationships non-meretricious.
Michelle can recover
From Lee, her ex-lover,
If his promises weren’t capricious.
Michelle and Lee lived in sin,
A fact once viewed with chagrin.
Now she can recover
From her ex-lover
If he promised to keep her in gin.
Sometimes you really can sum up a case in five lines, as this
Limerick pretty much exhausts the story of Normile v. Miller109
and serves to remind students that communication of a sale to
another suffices to revoke an offer:
As if sensing what lay ahead,
The counterofferor said,
“You snooze, you lose!”
That’s enough to excuse
Her for selling to Segal instead.
I don’t even assign Krell v. Henry. I just recite this Limerick and
save my students some reading:
Was Henry’s whole purpose frustrated
When the King burst appendix dictated
That the crown must delay
It's coronation day?
Yes! So contract doctrine’s updated.
Recognizing the element of truth in Karl Llewellyn’s contention
that it is hard to imagine a less efficient mechanism for the
communication of useful information than the case method, one
can supplement that method with some lectures on doctrine. The
method can be very efficient if it is interesting. A summary of

108

18 Cal.3d 660 (1976).

109

326 S.E.2d 11 (NC 1985)
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legal doctrine punctuated with Limericks can be diverting enough
to increase the likelihood that students will follow.

B.

Limericks as Illustrations of Types of
Judicial Reasoning

Legal Realism arose after the case method and to some extent
as a reaction against the formalistic approaches associated with
Langdell and his approach to pedagogy.110 Today, we recognize
that one very important task of first-year courses is to introduce
students to different approaches to the law. Law students must
understand that different judges will bring different jurisprudential
values to the cases over which they preside and that those values
can affect outcomes. Limericks can help to illustrate this aspect of
the judicial process.
For example, first-year contracts courses often have a narrative
component. We trace, over the course of the semester the
development of the law from its more formalistic bent in the 19th
century into the modern era of the Restatement (2d) and the
Uniform Commercial Code.
Part of the process involves
familiarizing students with the differing approaches represented by
Samuel Williston and Arthur Corbin. Their differences on the
parol evidence rule are illustrated in Sherrodd, Inc. v. MorrisonKnudsen.111 Sherrodd, Inc. was a small business that contracted
with Morrison Knudsen to do some earthmoving work. Sherrodd
agreed to do so for a fixed price, but the job turned out to be far
bigger than expected.112 Morrison-Knudsen allegedly gave oral
assurances that Sherrodd would be paid based on the work done,
rather than the flat fee indicated in the parties’ written
agreement.113 The court sided with Morrison-Knudsen, finding
that Sherrodd’s allegation of fraud was not the sort that could
overcome the parol evidence rule.114
Behold, parol’s bitter fruit:
Sherrodd’s claim was deemed moot!

110

See Rubin, 60 VAND. L. REV. at 613, n.9 (describing the intense criticism
to which legal realists subjected the case method).
111

815 P.2d 1135 (Mont. 1991).

112

Id. at 1136.

113

Id.

114

Id. at 1137.

Langdellian Limericks

27

If he only knew,
The great Corbin would spew
To see Williston's rule win repute.
The case never ceases to outrage at least some students and thus
leads to a very fruitful discussion of the pitfalls of oral
agreements. In addition, it shows that a formal approach to
contracts law is still with us.
Karl Llewellyn is another key figure in the first-year contracts
narrative narrative. Students should understand that Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code deviates from the common law in
ways that are best understood in terms of Karl Llewellyn’s more
general goal of making commercial law more responsive to the
actual practices of the people engaged in commercial
transactions.115
There once was a man named Llewellyn
Commercial contracts’ Megellyn
All stand in awe
Of his modernized lawe . . .
Hey! He modernized contracts, not spellyn!
This Limerick is intended to solidify the character of Llewellyn in
the students’ consciousness and to help them overcome the feeling
that his thought must be as impenetrable as is the correct spelling
of his name (to people not of Scottish extraction).
In Market Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey,116 Judge
Posner labored to explain how one could understand the need for
the contracts doctrine of “good faith” without resort to moral
principles.117 Judge Posner attempts to understand the doctrine of

115

See Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1940-49, 51 SMU L. REV. 275, 282 (1988) (describing Llewellyn’s
primary aim as “enforcing trade norms in commercial law).
116
117

941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991).

See id. at 595 (noting that “despite its moralistic overtones,” the concept
of good faith does not inject moral principles into contract law but merely helps
to minimize the costs of performance). Todd D. Rakoff provides a thorough and
thoughtful discussion of the case in Good Faith in Contract Performance:
Market Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1187
(2007).
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good faith as a mechanism for preventing post-contractual
opportunistic behavior that could increase transactions costs.118
“Don’t get moralistic with me,”
Said Judge Posner to trustee, GE.
“Though when I hear ‘good faith,’
I reach for my [Ring]wraith,119
Opportunists ain’t my cup o’ tea.”
This Limerick, is intended to lend a sort of poetic grandeur to
Judge Posner’s campaign against the conflation of moral and legal
norms.
In addition to introducing first-year students to different
judicial philosophies, the case method does provide opportunities
to introduce students to the challenges of statutory construction
and to acquaint them the complex relationship between the courts
and legislatures. Giving effect to the will of the legislature can be
a challenge, as illustrated in the classic lost-volume case, Neri v.
Retail Marine Corp.120 The Court of Appeals’ ruling seems to
accord with the legislative intent of UCC § 2-708(2), which was
supposed to be designed to permit the recovery of lost profits. 121
In order to give effect to that intent, the court had to ignore the last
phrase of the provision: “due credit for payments or proceeds of
resale.”122 Neri illustrates the dilemma courts may face when
confronted with statutory language clearly at odds with the
drafters’ stated intent.123 While it may seem bold – or even
118

See 941 F.2d at 595 (“The office of the doctrine of good faith is to forbid
the kinds of opportunistic behavior that a mutually dependent, cooperative
relationship might enable in the absence of rule.”).
119

When I show this Limerick to my students on a PowerPoint slide, it is
accompanied by a richly detailed artist’s rendering of a Ringwraith from
Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings. The image never fails to produce an appreciative
gasp from the class nerds. Because I can rely on the image when I show the
Limerick in class, in that context “Ring” is omitted from the rendition of the
poem, which makes the line work better metrically.
120

285 N.E.2d 311 (NY 1972).

121

JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMER, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§8-9, n.2 (6th ed. 2010) (citing Official Comment 2 to the UCC, which indicated
the drafters’ intent to “permit the recovery of lost profits” in a lost-volume case).
122
123

Neri, 285 N.E. at 313-315.

See Shanker, The Case for a Literal Reading of UCC § 2-708(2) 24
CASE W. L. REV. 697, 697-98 (1973) (contending that a literal reading of UCC §
2-708(2) would deny recovery for lost-volume).
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illegitimate for a court to ignore statutory language, most courts
have followed Neri and judicially “fixed” what appears to be a
clear drafting error.124
In Neri, New York’s highest court
Offered lost volume sellers a port.
They’d still be at sea
If New York’s UCC
Weren’t lopped off a half-sentence short.
The Limerick invites discussions of both statutory interpretation
and institutional competence. Students often arrive at law school
with the notion that legislatures and not judges should make law –
a rather peculiar prejudice that three years of studying judge-made
common law often does little to cure. After the students consider
the Neri opinion, it is useful to ask students how likely they think a
state legislature would be to “fix” the working of a section of the
UCC so as to more accurately reflect the drafters’ meaning. That
discussion can then lead into a more general conversation about the
processes that lead to law-making and law reform.

C. Limericks as Jurisprudential Critique
Legal Limericks are a serious business but not a solemn one.
Limericks can pack a punch and raise serious challenges to legal
reasoning. One of the purposes of the case method is to encourage
students to develop their skills at questioning judicial opinions or
distinguishing opinions that do not serve their clients’ purposes.
Limericks can provide a reminder and an example of some of the
techniques for doing so.
Limericks allow instructors to adopt a strong critical voice
that they need not commit to as their own. So, for example, in
Izadi v. Machado (Gus) Ford, Inc.,125 plaintiff attempted to get
$3000 in credit on a vehicle, which the court assumed to be worth
significantly less than $3000 based on an allegedly misleading
advertisement.126 The case turned on whether the advertisement

124

See e.g., Famous Knitwear v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir.
1974) (following Neri’s interpretation of UCC § 2-708(2)); National Controls,
Inc. v. Commodore Bus. Machines, Inc., 163 Cal.App.3d 688, 697-98 (Cal. App.
1st Dist. 1985) (noting that courts have uniformly followed Neri’s interpretation
of UCC § 2-708(2)).
125

550 So.2d 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

126

Id. at 1138 & n.2.
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was specific enough to constitute an offer directed at Izadi.127 The
court, displeased at the misleading nature of the advertisement,
found various justifications for holding that an offer had been
alleged.128 Arguably, Izadi was not mislead, he was merely
opportunistic:
Want to make a used-car dealer weep?
Try to trade in your rusting junk-heap.
Then pretend that you’re mad
On account of his ad,
And seek justice not blind but asleep.
Similarly, the resort to estoppel in Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc.129 is
open to criticism. In that case, an employer named Shopmaker
offered his 67-year-old brother-in-law, Katz, a pension in order to
lure him into retirement.130 However, shortly after the retirement,
Katz returned to work part-time for another company and for
Danny Dare. Shopmaker then first cut Katz’s pension payments in
half and then cut them off completely on the ground that Katz was
employed elsewhere.131 Overturning the trial court’s finding that
Katz had done nothing in reliance on Shopmaker’s promise to pay
him a pension, since Katz was an at-will employee and could have
been fired without a pension, the court found that Katz was entitled
to the full payment based on promissory estoppel.132
Shopmaker could have fired Katz.
Instead, they held family chats.
Now a pension is due,
Though Katz’ work days aren’t through.
Estoppel here seems a bit bats.

127

Id. at 1138-39.

128

See id. at 1139 (reinstating plaintiff’s breach of contract claim based on
the court’s characterization of the offer as a “bait and switch”); id. at 1140-41
(reinstating plaintiff’s statutory claims for violations of Florida’s Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act).
129

610 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App.1980).

130

Id. at 123. Katz also had some physical and mental impairments because
he was struck in the head while trying to impede a robbery at Danny Dare. Id. at
122.
131

Id.

132

Id. at 124-26.
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The case and the Limerick provide an opportunity to discuss
litigation strategies. It seems clear that Danny Dare breached a
promise to Katz. Why was that promise not treated as a
contractual obligation? Why did the court focus on promissory
estoppel, which seemed a stretch in this case?
In Fitzpatrick v. Michael,133 the court found itself unable to
provide a remedy for plaintiff, Marie Fitzpatrick, who had taken
care of an elderly man at a very low wage in return for a promise
that she would inherit his property upon his demise. Although the
court first announced that “[t]here can be no possible doubt that
upon these facts the plaintiff should be entitled to some relief
against the defendant,”134 it was unwilling to compel the defendant
“to accept the personal services of an employee against his wish
and his will.”135 This Limerick imagines a judge less bound by
convention:
I now pronounce you and Marie
To be bound by this solemn decree:
She will be your nurse,
‘Til you leave in a hearse;
You owe that to your promisee.
I suggest to my students that if the judge explained to Mr. Michael
that Ms. Fitzpatrick would live in his house, cook for him, care for
him and nurse him in illness until the day he died, Mr. Michael
would likely negotiate a settlement that would benefit both parties
and not leave Ms. Fitzpatrick uncompensated for her labor.
This prediction is then undercut by the next case we discuss,
Brackenbury v. Hodgkin,136 in which Mr. and Mrs. Brackenbury
sought the specific performance of a promise from Mrs.
Brackenbury’s mother, Sarah Hodgkin that, if they would care for
her, she would let them live in her house and take possession of it
after her death.137 The court granted the relief sought, essentially
ordering Mrs. Hodgkin to continue to live with her daughter and
son-in-law.138 One might expect that some sort of settlement
would result, especially since Mrs. Hodgkin’s son Walter was a co133

9 A.2d 639 (Md. 1939).

134

Id. at 641.

135

Id. at 643.

136

102 A. 106 (Me. 1917).

137

Id. at 107.

138

Id. at 108.
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defendant in the case, as she had sought to transfer title of her
home to him.139 The transfer could now proceed with appropriate
compensation being paid. As even Mrs. Hodgkin’s great grandson
described her as “irascible,” one would expect that the
Brackenbury family would be eager to accept payment and
leave.140 But Mr. and Mrs. Brackenbury and Mrs. Hodgkin
decided to tough it out. According to one of Mrs. Hodgkin’s sons,
at meal times, food was not passed to Mrs. Hodgkin but thrown,
and she was forced to eat with an old iron fork with two tines
broken off,141 a fact that inspired the following Limerick:
I’d sooner kiss a chimera
Than put up with my in-law, Old Sarah,
Now whenever she dines,
Her fork has but two tines,
And her home ain’t no French Riviera.
One last example: in Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil
Co.,142 the Ninth Circuit used trade usage and course of
performance evidence to override the express terms of an asphalt
provision agreement, stating that Nanakuli would pay Shell’s
posted price on the date of delivery.143 The court manufactured a
new standard in justifying its practice, stating that such evidence
could be used to “cut down” but not to contradict an express price
term.144 It provided, as an example of an interpretation that would
contradict the express price term, one in which Nanakuli’s price
rather than Shell’s would govern.145
Was the Ninth Circuit snorting patchouli
Letting parol in to help Nanakuli?
Shell Oil was brought low

139

Id. at 107.

140

See MACAULEY, et al. at 284 (citing Douglas I. Hodgkin).

141

Id. (citing Mrs. Brackenbury’s younger brother). The casebook recounts
other litigation involving the family. Not surprisingly, Mrs. Hodgkin’s will was
contested. Id.
142

664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981).

143

Id. at 780-806.

144

Id. at 805.

145

Id.
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As if by a blow
From the club of a trade-use Gillooly.146
The opinion certainly provides ample justification for the court’s
decision to protect the price Nankuli paid for asphalt. However, it
also provides an opportunity for a drafting exercise. One can first
ask the students to try to redraft the price term of the agreement
between Shell and Nanakuli so as to make clear that there would
be no price protection. There can follow a discussion of why the
parties might not have made their intentions with respect to price
protection clearer in the original version.

CONCLUSION
Even Langdell’s critics have acknowledged that the case
method has its advantages. One such advantage is the method’s
flexibility. The case method can be supplemented with lectures
and problems or with technological aids that promote more active,
in-class engagement with case law. Legal Limericks are a handy
tool that a contracts professor can have in her bag as a means of
enhancing the case-law approach to legal education. Langdell’s
nineteenth-century methodology can be made more relevant to
twenty-first century legal training through this humble eighteenthcentury poetic form.

146

Jeff Gillooly pleaded guilty to having taken a club to the knee of figure
skater Nancy Kerrigan at the 1994 U.S. Olympic Trials. A PowerPoint slide
showing Nancy Kerrigan forcing a smile while seated next to Tonya Harding is
usually enough to jog students’ memories.
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Appendix
Langdellian Limericks
The Complete Collection
Part I: Formation
Hurley v. Eddingfield
Though his patient’s pallor was green
The doctor would not intervene.
This no-house-calls sort
Was indulged by the court,
Which considered his conduct obscene.
Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc.
Ray’s specs were enough to confound
These “hatchet and saw” men, whose ground
For breaching the pact
Was mistake of fact,
But they signed it, and so they are bound.
Park 100 Investors v. Kartes
The Karteses signed the “lease papers,”
A guaranty hidden in vapors.
The court found this coarse
And would not enforce
A contract procured through such capers.
Lefkowitz v. Great Minn. Surplus Store
Mo Lefkowitz made his career
Finding ads explicit and clear.
He’s the first to the store;
Now he’s got furs galore,
And the price that he pays isn’t dear.
Izadi v. Machado (Gus) Ford, Inc.
Want to make a used-car dealer weep?
Try to trade in your rusting junk-heap,
Then pretend that you’re mad

On account of his ad
And seek justice not blind but asleep.
Leonard v. Pepsico
Intent to be bound was a barrier
To Leonard’s acquiring a Harrier.
Now he only drinks Coke,
And he gets every joke
But I would not say he’s much merrier.
Doe v. One America Productions
Some guys who got drunk during “Borat”
Signed releases with terms they’re now sore at.
Though they waived every right,
They sued claiming false light,
Giving students a claim they can roar at.
Normile v. Miller
As if sensing what lay ahead,
The counterofferor said
“You snooze you lose.”
That’s enough to excuse
Her for selling to Segal instead.
Fischer v. Union Trust
Consideration provision is tough:
One dollar isn’t enough.
Has this court grown weary
Of peppercorn theory
Or is the transaction a bluff
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Hamer v. Sidway

Hill v. Gateway

Did dissolute William fulfill
A promise to rich Uncle Will?
Yes, forbearance from vice,
Said the court, will suffice
As performance, and so it is still.

Could a problem with contract formation
Save the Hills from forced arbitration?
No, the court will compel,
And consign you to Dell.
It ain’t court, but it sure beats damnation.

Intro to the UCC

Klocek v. Gateway

There once was a man named Llewellyn,
Commercial contracts’ Meggellyn.
All stand in awe
Of his modernized lawe.
Hey! He modernized contracts, not spellyn!

UCC Section 2-207
Provided the unlikely leaven.
Ralph Nader is smiling
And consumers are filing
In Kansas, the new plaintffs’ heaven.

Battle of the Forms Limerick

Colonial Dodge v. Miller

To rhyme on the battle of forms
Would intrude upon poetic norms.
2-207 in verse
Might even be worse
Than an ode to the new tax reforms.

Before you purchase a good,
It’s best to look under the hood.
The good here is a dodge,
The case, a hodgepodge,
And the law not well understood.
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Part II: Promissory Estoppel and Charitable Subscriptions
Kirksey v. Kirksey

James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.

From a house to a hut to the street
Was the course of Ms. Kirksey’s retreat
She could not recover
From her in-law (her lover?)
Who’d nakedly promised a suite.

When they offered a bid to James Baird,
Gimbel Brothers egregiously erred.
They were in deep shinoleum
For not laying linoleum,
But Judge Hand, their bottoms he spared.

Greiner v. Greiner

Drennan v. Star Paving

At wheat-sowing time, in a bank,
Maggie promised some acreage to Frank.
“He did nothing for me!”
Averred Maggie, with glee.
For his land Frank has Corbin to thank.

After reading the views of Judge Hand,
Star Paving could not understand
What the fuss was about.
Bidders used to bail out;
Now all bow to estoppel’s command.

Rickets v. Scothorn

Allegheny College

This was the start of estoppel:
Said Grandpa to Katie, “Poppop’ll
Set you up nice.”
She took his advice,
And left her old job in the shop-pel.

Although her estate was inheritable,
Ms. Johnston chose to be charitable.
A bargain was struck,
Her heir’s out of luck:
To the College Cardozo was fairitable.

Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores

King v. Boston University

Hoffman moved from Wautoma to Chilton
And his finances were slowly wiltin’.
Because legal science
Protects sound reliance,
He recovered from Red Owl’s jiltin’.
or
He’s more popular than Paris Hilton

Coretta Scott King’s defiance
Could not overcome legal science.
The gift is a fact
Because it was backed
By consideration (or reliance).

Katz v. Danny Dare
Shopmaker could have fired Katz,
But instead they had family chats.
Now a pension is due,
Though Katz’ work days aren’t through.
Estoppel here seems a bit bats.
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Part III: Restitution and Moral Consideration
Credit Bureau Enterprises, Inc. v. Pelo
Does the doctrine of restitution
Provide for a fair resolution?
It keeps doctors secure
Though consent is obscure
And thus may prevent self-execution.
Oliver v. Campbell
Campbell wasn’t unjustly enriched
By the lawyer whose contract he’d ditched.
Counsel could have earned more
If he’d been fired before
Or claimed Campbell’s wife was bewitched.
Mills v. Wyman
Seth Wyman’s interior forum
Is not the law’s sanctum sanctorum
With this none would quarrel:
Seth’s conduct’s immoral.
Still, he breaches not law but decorum.
Webb v. McGowin
After giving the pine block a toss,
Webb spotted McGowin, his boss.
Preventing the harm
Cost a leg and an arm
The estate must extinguish Webb’s loss.
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Part IV: Statute of Frauds and Parol Evidence
Thompson v. Libby

Buffaloe v. Hart

A plan to buy logs fit for yule
Met up with the “four-corners” rule;
The parties, they feuded
But the court, it excluded
Parol. How Grinchy! How cruel!

Acceptance of “goods” was the start
Of Buffaloe’s barn deal with Hart.
A torn check was the end,
Evincing a trend
To bind through Llewellyn’s black art.

Sherrodd v. Morrison-Knudsen

Brookside Farms v. Mama Rizzo’s, Inc.

Behold, parol’s bitter fruit:
Sherrodd’s claim was deemed moot.
If he only knew,
The great Corbin would spew
To see Williston’s rule win repute.

Addressing the judge as “Coxcomb-a,”
Mama Rizzo flew back to Roma.
In rejecting her Answer,
This judge has cured cancer,
The dread basil sale carcinoma.

Winternitz v. Summit Hills

Fitzpatrick v. Michael

Hard cases result in bad laws.
But there’s a solution because
The court can resort
To a sort of a tort
To remedy equity’s flaws.

I now pronounce you and Marie
To be bound by this solemn decree:
She will be your nurse,
‘Til you leave in a hearse;
You owe that to your promisee.

Alaska Democrats v. Rice

Brackenbury v. Hodgkin

This just in from our anchor, Ted Koppel:
The Statute of Frauds just may topple.
Politicians are snarky,
And yet their malarchy
Is binding if backed by estoppel.

I’d sooner kiss a chimera
Than put up with my in-law, Old Sarah,
Now whenever she dines,
Her fork has but two tines,
And her home ain’t no French Riviera.
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Part V: Incomplete Contracts and Interpretation
Raffles v. Wichelhaus

Nanakuli Paving v. Shell Oil

In Peerless, a contract for cotton
Was found by the court to be rotten.
To Liverpool sailed
Two ships that so hailed
No consensus ad idem was gotten.

Was the Ninth Circuit snorting patchouli
Letting parol in to help Nanakuli?
Shell Oil was brought low
As if by a blow
From the bat of a trade-use Gillooly.

Dunnebacke v. Pittman

Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon

Mrs. Gilligan was not in thrall;
No agreement could she recall.
Pittman may lose his biz,
But something there is
That doesn’t love a wall.

The Titanic’s wreck, that was rough,
But nothing could sink Lady Duff!
Lucy’s couture
Is now de rigeur;
But Wood gets to market her stuff.

Frigaliment v. B.N.S.

Clark v. West

Of Judge Friendly’s great chicken coup,
Shakespeare’s witches could make much ado
With Defendants they’d howl,
“Foul is fair, fair is fowl”
That is, chickens fit only for stew.

Was Clark due six dollars a page
For his work as a bibulous sage?
Yes, be West’s own volition
It waived the condition
Of temperance for the man it engaged.
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Balfour v. Balfour
Balfour gave in to his id,
And stopped paying his wife thirty quid.
His word has no force,
For, before their divorce,
The pair did not think that it did.
Marvin v. Marvin
The Marvin court’s ruling’s propitious
For relationships non-meretricious.
Michelle can recover
From Lee, her ex-lover,
If his promises weren’t capricious.
or
Michelle and Lee lived in sin,
A fact once viewed with chagrin.
Now she can recover
From her ex-lover
If he promised to keep her in gin.
Borelli v. Brusseau (Majority)
Is only the one in the blouse
Expected to care for her spouse?
No, the same law applies
To the gals and the guys
Who must care for their partners in-house.
(Dissent)
Is only the one in the blouse
Expected to care for her spouse?
Love, Honor, Cherish
And clean bed-pans – that’s marriage!
A housewife’s still wed to a house.
Carroll v. Beardon
In Montana arose a dispute
O’er a house of doubtful repute.
The seller madame,

Not in on the scam
May partake of her share of the loot.
In re Baby M
“Illegal, criminal and void!”
Cried the court, more than slightly annoyed.
“Let’s put a lid
On this sale of a kid.”
But who’ll pay for her sessions with Freud?
Totten v. United States
The President gamely employed
But then stiffed an agent named Lloyd.
Abe knew Lee’s plan
Because of this man,
But the court found his legal claims void.
Sherwood v. Walker
Because of a mutual mistake,
Poor Rose was thought of as steak.
But the court did discover
Her essence was “lover”
So Sherwood made do with milk shake.
Lewanee County v. Messerly
The waste leaked in torrents, not trickles.
Now the property ain’t worth two nickels.
When “as is” you take,
You eat your mistake,
So bon appetite, Mr. Pickles.
Market Street Associates v. Frey
“Don’t get moralistic with me,”
Said Judge Posner to trustee, GE.
”Though when I hear ‘good faith,’
I reach for my wraith.
Opportunists ain’t my cup o’ tea.”
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Locke v. Warner Brothers

Burch v. Second Judicial District

There once was an actress named Locke
Whose Ratboy was thought to be schlock.
Old Clint and Warner
Thought they could scorn her
But bad faith they neglected to grok.

If you don’t think to file for mandamus,
Your client may shout, “Ignoramus!”
Now after appeal,
The Burches can squeal
“We may not be rich but we’re famous!”

Donahue v. FedEx

Taylor v. Caldwell

Plaintiff, an employee at will,
Thought his boss had a hand in the till.
FedEx is correct;
“Bad faith” won’t protect
Those whose policy contentions are nil.

Taylor rented a hall like the Met’s
For the purpose of concerts and fetes
When fire the hall downed
The court kindly found
A way to excuse Caldwell’s debts.

Syester v. Banta

Krell v. Henry

In the shallow end of the gene pool:
Met a widow and a young dancing fool
Who had to teach her for squat
How to waltz and foxtrot
Because misleading widows is cruel.

Was Henry’s whole purpose frustrated
When the King’s burst appendix dictated
The crown must delay
Its Coronation Day?
Yes! So contracts doctrine’s updated.

Selmer v. Blakeslee-Midwest

Transatlantic Financing v.
United States

In Selmer v. Blakeslee-Midwest,
Judge Posner creates a new test.
Mere business stress
Does not make duress.
Thus breaching parties are blessed.
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
When he learned of Ms. Williams’ plight,
“Unconscionable!” said Skelly-Wright
If you sell door-to-door
The court may abhor
You and void all your contracts in spite.

His passage through Suez foreclosed,
Plaintiff sailed ‘round the horn and supposed
He’d find some utility
In impracticability
But Skelly Wright found he gets hosed.
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Parker v. 20th Century Fox
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent
The studio’s conduct was terrible
And the actress’s damage repairable
Only with a lead part
In a great work of art:
A film that is at least comparable.

Kent called for beheading or stripes
When his builder eschewed Reading pipes.
There was no harm financial;
The court found substantial
Performance, ignoring Kent’s gripes.

Neri v. Retail Marine Corp.
Sullivan v. O’Connor
In Neri, New York’s highest court
Offered lost volume sellers a port.
They’d still be at sea
If New York’s UCC
Weren’t lopped off a half-sentence short.
Hadley v. Baxandale
Foresee that things can end badly.
And keep that in mind, or else sadly,
A life of regret
Is all you will get
If your harm’s consequential – poor Hadley!
Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead
If drive-ins were all ever green,
Lost profits would be routine,
Though the business be new,
And the picture askew,
Showing Michael Moore naked on screen.
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal
Before you let Garland Coal
Turn your backyard into a hole,
Make sure that your land
Is worth 25 grand
Or your state Supreme Court has a soul!

Assessing a botched operation
Requires tort-like harm calculation.
Suffering and pain
Invade contracts domain
Both as reliance and expectation.

